The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008 by Costrell, Robert M.
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
School Choice Demonstration Project Education Reform
2-1-2008
The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin,
1993-2008
Robert M. Costrell
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/scdp
Part of the Education Policy Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy
Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Education Reform at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in School
Choice Demonstration Project by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu,
ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Costrell, Robert M., "The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008" (2008).
School Choice Demonstration Project. 45.
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/scdp/45
The Fiscal Impact of the  
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program  
in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008
Robert M. Costrell
SCDP Milwaukee Evaluation Report #2
February 2008
50 February 2008
The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008
The University of Arkansas  
was founded in 1871 as the flagship institution 
of higher education for the state of Arkansas. 
Established as a land grant university, its mandate was threefold: to teach students, conduct 
research, and perform service and outreach.
The College of Education and Health Professions established the Department of Education 
Reform in 2005. The department’s mission is to advance education and economic development 
by focusing on the improvement of academic achievement in elementary and secondary schools. 
It conducts research and demonstration projects in five primary areas of reform: teacher quality,  
leadership, policy, accountability, and school choice.
The School Choice Demonstration Project (SCDP), based within the Department of Education 
Reform, is an education research center devoted to the non-partisan study of the effects of school 
choice policy and is staffed by leading school choice researchers and scholars.  Led by Dr. Patrick 
J. Wolf, Professor of Education Reform and Endowed 21st Century Chair in School Choice, 
SCDP’s national team of researchers, institutional research partners and staff are devoted to the 
rigorous evaluation of school choice programs and other school improvement efforts across the 
country.  The SCDP is committed to raising and advancing the public’s understanding of the 
strengths and limitations of school choice policies and programs by conducting comprehensive 
research on what happens to students, families, schools and communities when more parents are 
allowed to choose their child’s school.  
The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008
Robert M. Costrell
SCDP Comprehensive Longitudinal Evaluation of the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program 
Report #2
February 2008
School Choice Demonstration Project
Department of Education Reform
University of Arkansas






The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008
The Fiscal Impact of the MPCP in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008
Executive Summary
Throughout the history of publicly-funded voucher programs – enacted and proposed – the impact on 
taxpayers has been a recurring issue.  As the nation’s longest-running program, the Milwaukee Parent 
Choice Program (MPCP) provides an important case study.   The fiscal impact of Milwaukee’s program 
has evolved in very significant ways over its 18-year history, both in size, as the program grew, and in its 
allocation among different groups of taxpayers – Milwaukee property taxpayers, non-Milwaukee property 
taxpayers, and Wisconsin state taxpayers.   This report closely examines the features of the MPCP funding 
formula, and its interaction with the state’s regular district funding formula over the program’s history to 
better understand the impact on taxpayers.
The report’s first set of key findings assesses the net impact on taxpayers of the MPCP over the life of the 
program, compared to likely scenarios had the MPCP never existed:
(1) The size of the net impact is somewhat sensitive to the assumed scenarios in the absence of the 
MPCP, but for most likely scenarios the net impact is positive taxpayer savings.  One representative 
scenario implies taxpayer savings rose from $1.6 million in FY94 to $24.6 million in FY07 and $31.9 
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Figure ES-1:  Potential Taxpayer Gains from the MPCP
(assumption:  90% of voucher students would otherwise have enrolled in MPS)
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The source of taxpayer savings is the difference between the size of the voucher and the per pupil amount 
of state and local revenues that would have gone to the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) in the absence 
of the MPCP.  According to data on revenue limits per pupil from the Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction (DPI), the difference was $2,332 in FY07 and $2,640 in FY08. 
The other main determinant of the net fiscal impact is the percent of MPCP enrollees that would have 
attended public schools in the absence of the program.   Different observers evaluate different pieces of 
evidence on this question in varying ways.  The rate of 90% assumed in Figure ES-1 is a scenario that is 
based on scientific evidence from voucher lotteries in other cities; it is also consistent with evidence on 
declining private school enrollment in Milwaukee prior to the MPCP and elsewhere.
The report’s second set of key findings examines the allocation of the net impact among Milwaukee 
property taxpayers, non-Milwaukee property taxpayers, and Wisconsin state taxpayers.  This is very much 
dependent on the structure of the funding formulas.
(2) Wisconsin’s regular district funding formulas provide an informative benchmark for comparison.  
These formulas have two key features.  First, they are enrollment-sensitive in the long run.  Second, any 
net savings that would free up state aid is automatically directed to a reduction in property taxes around 
the state.  With these features, if the state had funded the voucher program by adapting the regular district 
funding formulas, the net taxpayer savings would have been shared among Milwaukee property taxpayers 
and non-Milwaukee property taxpayers.  Figure ES-2 illustrates one way the net impact depicted in ES-1 
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Figure ES-2:  Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under General Aid and Revenue Formulas
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS;  total of aid + voucher expenditures held constant)
Milwaukee property taxpayers Other property taxpayers
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(3) Instead, Wisconsin developed a specific MPCP funding mechanism, which has been modified over the 
life of the program.  Under this mechanism, Milwaukee property taxpayers have been adversely affected, 
unlike the benchmark case discussed above.  The net beneficiaries have primarily been non-Milwaukee 
property taxpayers and state taxpayers.  Figure ES-3 provides an estimate of how the net impact depicted 
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Figure ES-3:  Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under the MPCP Formula
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS;  state share of public education held constant at 2/3)
Milwaukee property taxpayers Other property taxpayers State taxpayers Milwaukee Public Schools
Early in the history of the program, when enrollments were small and impacts were modest, MPS funding 
was maintained as voucher students left MPS.  This raised per pupil revenues in MPS, while increases in 
Milwaukee property taxes paid for the vouchers.  The subsequent history of the MPCP formula included 
some changes that helped integrate funding with the regular district formulas, and other changes that 
helped ameliorate the adverse impact on Milwaukee.   However, some of the initial features remained 
intact, so as the program grew, the adverse impact on Milwaukee grew as well.   
Specifically, the MPCP funding mechanism continues to deduct aid from MPS for 45% of the voucher 
expenses, even though the general aid formulas no longer allocate any funds to MPS for voucher students.  
MPS is allowed to recoup these funds by raising the property tax.  The net result is an adverse impact on 
Milwaukee property taxpayers due to this funding mechanism.   By contrast, other taxpayers benefit from 
the MPCP, since the funds that would otherwise be allocated to MPS for these students are freed up.  
This benefit outweighs the direct state expenditures for 55% of the vouchers. 
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Under the estimate depicted in ES-3, by FY07, the $24.6 million net benefit was allocated as a $42.3 
million savings for non-Milwaukee property taxpayers and a $29.3 million savings for Wisconsin state 
taxpayers, offset by a $47.0 million adverse impact on Milwaukee property taxpayers.   In response to 
this situation, the state appropriated $7.4 million of property tax relief for Milwaukee in FY08, in lieu of 
proposals to reform the MPCP formula itself.
The history of the MPCP illustrates how voucher programs can provide significant taxpayer savings, 
when students voluntarily choose programs that draw less on public funds than the schools they would 
otherwise attend.  However, the same history also illustrates that if the funding formulas are not carefully 
constructed, some groups of taxpayers may be adversely affected instead of sharing in the net savings.  The 
initial funding mechanism may have been well-designed for the purpose at hand, when the program was 
small.  However, as the program grew, the mechanism carried unintended distributional consequences.   
Attempts to reform the mechanism have achieved some success, but the vestiges of the initial system 
continue to drive the allocation of burdens and benefits, even as the program has outgrown the funding 
system’s origins.
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Throughout the history of publicly-funded voucher programs – enacted and proposed – the impact on 
taxpayers has been a recurring issue.  As the nation’s longest-running program, the Milwaukee Parent 
Choice Program (MPCP) provides an important case study.   The fiscal impact of Milwaukee’s program 
has evolved in very significant ways over its 18-year history, both in size (as the program grew) and in its 
allocation among different groups of taxpayers – Milwaukee property taxpayers, non-Milwaukee property 
taxpayers, and Wisconsin state taxpayers.   This report closely examines the features of the MPCP funding 
formula, and its interaction with the state’s regular district funding formula over the program’s history to 
better understand the impact on taxpayers.2
The fiscal impact of vouchers can be broken down into two distinct questions:  (i) the amount of public 
funds potentially freed up by the transfer of students from district schools to voucher schools; and (ii) the 
allocation of those funds among various taxpayers by the funding formulas.  
With regard to the first question, the MPCP has long featured a voucher that is significantly below 
the per pupil revenues in the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS).  This difference provides significant 
potential taxpayer savings, much like those that would be generated by voluntary enrollment shifts from 
high-spending to low-spending districts.   The magnitude of these potential savings depends on the 
enrollments, and the number of voucher-users who would have attended MPS in their absence.  
These variables are examined in the first part of this report to estimate the net impact of the MPCP 
over the life of the program, compared to likely scenarios had the MPCP never existed.  The size of the 
net impact is somewhat sensitive to assumptions, but for most likely scenarios the net impact is positive 
taxpayer savings.
The second question is whether the funding system is structured to deliver these potential savings to the 
taxpayers, and, if so, which ones – state taxpayers, Milwaukee property taxpayers, or property taxpayers in 
1 I would like to acknowledge the very helpful comments of Anneliese Dickman, Andrew Rotherham, Andrew Reschovsky, 
and George Mitchell.  An advance copy of this report was reviewed by the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau and 
the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction.  I greatly benefited from discussion at my presentation to the SCDP 
Research Advisory Board.  John Witte provided helpful advice and a set of enrollment data.   Finally, I received excellent 
research assistance from Jeff Dean.
2  The term “impact on taxpayers” should be construed broadly to include either actual taxes paid or redirection of tax 
money to/from other public expenditures to offset the impact on general funds.
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other districts?  The answer depends on both the state’s district funding formula and the voucher funding 
formula.  
The Wisconsin school funding system is largely driven by enrollment, a fact that should, in principle, make 
it highly compatible with a system of school choice, where “the dollar follows the child.”  In addition, the 
savings from enrollment shifts to districts with lower expenditures are automatically shared by property 
taxpayers across the state.  It is a system that could, at least in principle, be adapted for funding of the 
voucher program, with comparable results.  However, Wisconsin chose not to follow the natural template 
of the general funding formula when it decided how to fund the MPCP. 
Instead, the state has adopted a series of voucher funding formulas, each of which has allocated the 
potential savings in a somewhat different fashion.  One constant issue, however, has been that none of the 
savings are shared by the property taxpayers of Milwaukee – their taxes have been consistently raised by 
the formula.   Rather, the savings generated by the MPCP have generally accrued to property taxpayers 
outside of Milwaukee and/or to state taxpayers.  This “funding flaw” (as it is commonly referred to) has 
been generally recognized among policy-makers and interest groups in Wisconsin.  Various modifications 
to the formula over the years have attempted to ameliorate this adverse impact, and further reforms have 
been proposed (most recently in the budget deliberations for the FY08-09 biennium), but the problem has 
persisted and grown with the size of the program.   
The second part of this report provides an analytical dissection of the funding formulas over the life of 
the MPCP, to help estimate and understand the allocation of the MPCP’s net impact among the various 
classes of taxpayers.   This analysis explains why the funding formula changes adopted thus far have not 
eliminated the problem.   Concluding remarks suggest possible lessons from the MPCP funding history.
Previous Analyses of the MPCP Fiscal Impact
Debates over the fiscal impact of the MPCP have gone through various phases over the program’s history.3 
Initially, the public and scholarly debates focused on the size of the voucher and/or MPCP school 
expenditures, compared to per pupil expenditures in MPS.  At issue here was the relative efficiency of the 
private and public schools. 
Although it is possible to compare per pupil expenditures, the relative efficiency ultimately rests on the 
educational results that different schools obtain from their expenditures.   This report does not consider 
educational results – that is the subject of the SCDP’s longitudinal analysis of MPCP performance.  
Instead, this report considers the separate question of the impact on taxpayers of the MPCP, independent 
of the educational results, so it cannot and does not address the issue of relative efficiency.
The most important work to date on the impact of the MPCP on taxpayers has been undertaken by the 
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau (LFB).  The LFB is statutorily charged with providing information 
to legislators on budget matters, including school funding formulas.4  Specifically, LFB has conducted 
periodic analyses, at the request of legislators and other public officials, of the fiscal impact of the MPCP 
3  See Appendix A for a selected review of this literature.
4  It regularly produces information papers on these formulas (timed to the biennial budget), cited below.
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on taxpayers, in and outside of Milwaukee.5  The question addressed by the LFB analyses is closely 
related, but not identical to the question asked in this report.  Instead of asking “what is the fiscal impact 
compared to likely scenarios had the MPCP never existed,” the LFB analyses respond to queries about the 
likely impact “if the program were eliminated.”
The LFB analyses imply that for each voucher student who would otherwise enroll in MPS, the public 
funds spent on the voucher are less than the funds that would otherwise be spent from property taxes and 
state taxes.  Consequently, if all the MPCP students would otherwise attend MPS, the net fiscal impact of 
eliminating the MPCP on state and local public funds taken together would be adverse.   For FY07, the 
impact implied by LFB estimates would have been $54.1 million.
LFB also analyzes the impact under the assumptions that 75%, 50%, 25% or 0% of MPCP students would 
otherwise attend MPS if the program were eliminated.   Under the 75% assumption, the net adverse 
impact is smaller ($12.9 million), and for the assumptions of 50% or less, the net impact is estimated to be 
a public saving.
The LFB analyses also show that the allocation of the net impact is very uneven.  Under all scenarios, the 
MPS levy would decline with the elimination of the voucher program, and under most scenarios the levies 
in the rest of the state (taken together) would rise.6
In general contours, the findings of this report are consistent with LFB’s analyses, despite some minor 
differences in methodology.  Later sections of this report will include a comparison.  This report’s main 
contribution is to provide a detailed analysis of how Wisconsin’s funding formulas came to spread the 
potential savings from the MPCP so unevenly among the state’s taxpayers.
MPCP Voucher and Expenditures vs. MPS Revenues and Expenditures
The basic data on which all analyses of the MPCP’s fiscal impact rest are the size of the voucher and one 
measure or another of MPS per pupil expenditures or revenues.   Figure 1 depicts the voucher and various 
such measures for the MPS.   The period depicted begins with the initial year of the MPCP, FY91.   
The maximum voucher began at $2,446 and rose steadily to $6,501 in FY07, which is unchanged in FY08, 
as shown with the solid red line.7  If a voucher school’s per pupil operating and debt service expenditures 
5  Among these analyses are those dated September 27, 2001 for Representative Antonio Riley, January 21, 2005 for 
Representative John Gard, January 23, 2006 for Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett, and January 14, 2008 for Representative 
Michael Huebsch.
6  The size of these impacts depends on whether it is assumed that the general fund appropriation for MPCP would be 
redirected to general school aids, since that feeds back through the state funding formulas to local property tax relief.    
LFB provides estimates under both assumptions.
7  Prior to FY00, the maximum voucher was equal to the per pupil equalization aid for Milwaukee.  From FY00-FY03, the 
voucher was set at the previous year’s value, incremented by the change in the per pupil revenue limit (determined 
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are lower, then the voucher is restricted to that.  The red dotted line depicts the average voucher, reflecting 
that restriction, for the years those data are available on-line.  Since this is within a few percent of the 
maximum voucher, and these data are only available with a lag, the remainder of this report will refer only 
to the maximum voucher.  Finally, the dashed red line depicts the average MPCP operating and debt 
















Source: DPI.  Note: the measure for MPS total expenditure changed, so is not strictly comparable before and after FY00.
Figure 1:  MPCP Voucher & Expenditures vs. MPS Revenues & Expenditures
MPS total revenue MPS total expenditure MPS current expenditure
MPS revenue limit maximum MPCP voucher average MPCP voucher
average MPCP expenditure implied revenue limit (LFB)
 
The per pupil expenditure figures for MPS are depicted with the green lines.   The total expenditure per 
pupil rose from $6,222 in FY91 to $11,885 in FY06 (the most recent year available), depicted with the 
dotted-and-dashed line.8  These figures include capital and other expenditures as well as instructional and 
support expenditures.   Since FY00, Wisconsin’s Department of Public Instruction (DPI) has calculated 
a measure of current expenditure, which “attempts to identify overall instructional and instructional 
support service costs” by excluding transportation, capital and debt service, and food and community 
statewide, as discussed below).  Since FY04, the voucher has been set at the previous year’s value, incremented by the 
statewide percent change in general school aid.  
8  The specific series depicted is “Complete Annual School Cost” (CASC) per member from FY91-FY99, and “Total District 
Cost” (TDC) per member from FY00-FY06, since the DPI switched measures in FY00.   In general, these are not strictly 
comparable before and after FY00 (as indicated by the dotted vs. dashed portion of the line), but for Milwaukee, the 
data do not exhibit a large discontinuity in that year.
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service expenditures.  This measure of current expenditure rose from $7,808 in FY00 to $10,332 in FY06, 
depicted with the solid green line.   Thus, MPS current expenditures per pupil have exceeded MPCP 
operating and debt service expenditures (the dashed red line) by an amount rising from about $2,700 in 
FY00 to about $3,500 in FY06.
We now turn to two MPS revenue measures, depicted with the blue lines.  Since FY00, DPI has 
calculated a figure for total revenue per pupil, a figure which includes Federal, state, property tax, and 
other local revenues.   It has risen from $9,227 in FY00 to $12,385 in FY06, as depicted with the dashed 
blue line.  This figure is now almost double the MPCP voucher, in part because it includes revenues 
available for capital and other non-comparable expenditures, but also because it includes Federal and other 
revenue sources not available for the MPCP.
The final measure depicted is the MPS per pupil revenue limit.  As discussed in more detail in subsequent 
sections of this report, the revenue limit covers the main source of state aid to MPS and MPS property 
taxes.   It does not include Federal revenues, as well as some other revenues, notably categorical state aid 
for special education and low-income students.   For the purposes of analyzing the impact of the MPCP 
on state and local taxpayers in Wisconsin, this is more appropriate than the previously discussed measures, 
and it is the measure that will be used in the remainder of this report.  It has risen steadily from $5,804 
in FY94 (the year Wisconsin established revenue limits) to $8,833 in FY07 and $9,141 for FY08,9 as 
depicted by the solid blue line.  The difference between the MPS revenue limit and the MPCP voucher 
was generally around $2,000 from FY97-03, but has drifted up over the last few years to $2,332 in FY07 
and $2,640 in FY08.10
This difference between the MPS revenue limit and the MPCP voucher is key to the analysis below, since 
it represents the potential taxpayer savings for each student in the MPCP who would otherwise attend 
MPS.  The LFB analyses imply a larger estimate of this potential savings.  The magnitude of the savings 
for each such voucher student has not been featured in public discussions of the LFB analysis, but it can 
be readily calculated from the data in the LFB tables.
In its most recent analysis ( January 14, 2008), for FY07, the LFB estimates that if all 17,000 voucher 
students returned to MPS, the revenue limit would rise by $164.6 million (when fully phased in).  This 
represents an effect of $9,682 for each student, which is $850 higher than the MPS revenue limit.11  This 
implies a savings from each MPCP student of $3,181 instead of the $2,332 figure given above.  Similar 
9  DPI’s October 23, 2007 estimate.
10  In percentage terms, the voucher has fluctuated in a narrow band, 71-74% of MPS’ revenue limit since FY98.
 
11  LFB’s calculations under the alternative assumptions of 75%, 50% and 25% enrollment of MPCP students in MPS all give 
the same estimate for per pupil impact on revenue limits as the 100% estimate given above.  That is, the total impact on 
revenue limits is linear in the number of students.   This is also true for LFB’s FY06 and FY05 estimates (January 23, 2006 
and January 21, 2005).
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estimates are implied by the LFB analyses for FY05 and FY06, as depicted in Figure 1, by the purple line 
fragment.   Thus, compared to LFB estimates, this report uses lower figures for potential taxpayer savings 
from each MPCP student who would have otherwise attended MPS.12
Enrollment
The other variables needed to calculate the net fiscal impact of the voucher program are enrollment in 
the MPCP and the number of voucher students who would have enrolled in the public schools.  MPCP 
enrollments are depicted in Figure 2.  Notable points on the diagram include the program’s expansion 
to religious schools in FY99, and the expansion of the program’s cap in FY07.  In all, after modest 
beginnings over the first eight years of the program, MPCP enrollments have expanded over the last 












FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
Figure 2:  MPCP Enrollment, FY91-08 
(full-time equivalents)
12  In communications with LFB it was determined that the main difference is in the timing of the simulated phase-in.  
The state’s revenue limit formula uses a three-year rolling average of enrollments.  This report assumes the phase-in 
is completed by the year in question, as is appropriate for an analysis of the scenario where MPCP had never existed.  
Since LFB is examining a different scenario, the elimination of MPCP, the phase-in begins in the year in question and is 
not completed until three years later.   This accounts for the vast majority of the difference in the two estimates.
13  These are in full-time equivalents (FTE’s), the measure used for MPCP funding.  FTE’s are a bit lower than headcounts, 
since four-year-old kindergarteners and summer school students count as less than one FTE.
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We now need to estimate the number of MPCP students who would have attended public schools, had 
the MPCP never existed.   There are a few kinds of evidence to consider.  By way of comparison, national 
survey data indicate the percentage of all children from low-income families who attend private schools is 
about 5%.14  
A better estimate can be derived from research conducted on other voucher programs, with random 
assignment.  These programs, like Milwaukee’s, are limited to low-income families – families that would 
find it difficult to pay tuition without a voucher for a sustained number of years.  The studies give the 
percent attending private schools among those who lose the lottery, for comparison with those who win. 
The research literature here is thin, but indicates a possible rate of 10-15% who would still attend private 
schools without the voucher after one year, dropping to under 5% by year three.15   A midrange estimate 
from this literature, 10%, is the main one used in this report.
In evaluating this estimate, or any other one, it is important to consider the trends that were underway in 
Milwaukee private schooling when the MPCP began.  Enrollments were declining, particularly among 
Catholic schools.   John Witte traces the decline in private enrollments to the late ‘60s, interrupted by 
a short-term increase beginning in 1978, due to involuntary busing.16  In 1987, a group of Milwaukee 
business leaders under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee organized to address the decline in 
the Catholic schools.  Later known as Partners Advancing Values in Education (PAVE), the group began 
offering scholarships for low-income children during the early years of the MPCP, when that program 
was restricted to non-sectarian schools.   These scholarships grew in anticipation of the expansion of the 
MPCP to religious schools.   When the court ruling allowed that expansion to occur, PAVE scholarships 
were cut back.17
Figure 3 depicts enrollment in Milwaukee’s private schools.   Specifically, the top curve (blue) represents 
total private enrollment data from DPI, a curve that continued to decline prior to the MPCP expansion, 
14  The figure is 4.1% for household income under $25,000 in 2003, and 8.2% for income in the range of $25,000-$50,000.   
(National Household Educational Survey, Parent and Family Involvement in Education, 2003, NCES)  The MPCP eligibility 
requirement is 175% of poverty threshold, which in 2003 would have been $32,918 for a household of four.  
15  For example, in the Federally funded DC voucher experiment, after one year 80% of winners attended private school 
and 11% of losers, which translates into an estimate of 14% (11/80) of voucher-users who would have attended private 
schools anyway.   Corresponding estimates among three relatively small privately-funded voucher programs (NYC, 
Ohio, DC) range from 5% to 23%, with a weighted average of 11%.   After a second year, the average drops to 9%, and 
after a third year it drops to 4%.  See Patrick Wolf, Babette Gutmann, Michael Puma, Lou Rizzo, Nada Eissa, and Marsha 
Silverberg. Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Impacts After One Year. U.S. Department of Education, 
Institute of Education Sciences. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, NCEE 2007-4009, pp. 36-38, 
and William G. Howell and Paul E. Peterson, with Patrick J. Wolf and David E. Campbell, The Education Gap:  Vouchers and 
Urban Schools, revised edition, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2002,  p. 45.
16  John F. Witte, The Market Approach to Education, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 40-41.
17  Paul E. Peterson, with Nathan Torinus and Brad Smith, “School Choice in Milwaukee Fifteen Years Later,” in Paul T. Hill, ed., 
Charter Schools Against the Odds:  An Assessment of the Koret Task Force on K-12 Education, Hoover Press, 2006, p. 79.
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and has risen since then.   The other two curves net out, respectively, MPCP enrollments and PAVE 
scholarships as well.18   Since many of the PAVE scholarships prior to the MPCP’s expansion were 
intended to facilitate that expansion, it may be helpful to net them out to get a better idea of the timing 
in the underlying trends.  Specifically, the purple and red curves depict the hypothetical trends in 
private enrollments, if none of the MPCP students would have otherwise attended private schools, with 
or without the PAVE students.   These data suggest that the trend on these curves after the MPCP’s 
expansion (FY99) was consistent with the trend prior to expansion.   However, the DPI data are not 
readily available prior to FY93, so these data cannot be directly compared with earlier trends, before the 
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Figure 3.  Milwaukee Non-Public Enrollment, FY93-08 
(September headcount)
Total (DPI) excluding MPCP excluding MPCP and PAVE
 
To go back earlier in time, Professor John Witte provided a longer series of private enrollments in 
Milwaukee, from FY60-FY97.   These data are from a different source and with a slightly different 
definition, but the series can be spliced together with the more recent DPI data, by considering differences 
18  The PAVE data depicted on the dotted portion of the curve (after PAVE shrunk in FY99) are the author’s estimates, based 
on financial reports.
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relative to FY93.19   Taking both series and netting out the MPCP and PAVE figures, we have 
the baseline curve (solid) depicted in Figure 4.20   As discussed above, Witte found that private 
enrollments showed a long-term decline, temporarily interrupted by the busing experience, but resuming 
its downward path prior to the MPCP.  The data depicted here suggest that the baseline trend after 
the MPCP is consistent with these long-term trends.   Figure 4 also shows trends under alternative 
assumptions on the percentage of the MPCP and PAVE students who otherwise would still have 
attended private schools.  The 10% assumption drawn from the voucher lottery literature yields a curve 
that is similarly consistent with the long-term trends.   Higher percentages, also depicted, would imply a 
























































































































Sources:   DPI, John Witte.   Series  spliced at FY93.   See text.
Figure 4:  Milwaukee Private Enrollment Trends, FY60-08
(excluding MPCP and PAVE.   Alternative percentages staying in private.)
baseline 10% private 30% private 50% private
19  These data appear in Witte (2000), Figure 3.4, p. 42.  For the period from FY80, the Witte data are those gathered by MPS 
pursuant to Wisconsin law that requires an annual child census.   The features of that census result in higher figures for 
private education among Milwaukee families than the DPI figures on Milwaukee private schools.   The census data have 
also been affected by significant changes in methodology in recent years, so when DPI data are available, they appear to 
be preferable.  However, the trends in these data are what is important, and they are comparable between data sets.
20  Excluding MPCP only (leaving in PAVE) results in a similar curve, with similar long-term trends, but with the difference in 
FY99 as depicted in Figure 3, when the PAVE scholarships were cut back with the expansion of MPCP.
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Of course, we have no way of knowing for sure whether the pre-MPCP trends would have continued, 
slowed, or reversed.  They could even have accelerated, if, for example, the decline in demand for private 
schools led to further school closings instead of just more empty seats.   No two cities are strictly 
comparable, but Chicago may provide an illustrative example of a case where the decline in urban private 
education seems to have accelerated during this period, in the absence of a large-scale voucher program.   
Figure 5, based on data from the U.S. Department of Education, indicates that Chicago’s private 
enrollments showed no trend from FY90-96, but then dropped 29% from FY96-06 (the most recent year 























Source:  NCES.   Private Schools Universe Survey and Common Core of Data.
Figure 5:  Enrollment Trends in Chicago, FY90-06
Public + Private Private  
To summarize, the estimate drawn from voucher lottery studies, that 10% of voucher students would 
have attended private schools had the MPCP not existed, is consistent with private enrollment trends 
in Milwaukee and elsewhere.  Other estimates may also be consistent, and net impact estimates will be 
provided below under alternative assumptions.  Some estimates, however, may be safely ruled out, if they 
imply non-credible alternative trends in private enrollments.22  
21  These data are from the Private Schools Universe Survey (PSS) conducted every two years since FY90 by the U.S. 
Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
22 Other pieces of evidence were considered.  For example, during part of the MPCP program, data were collected on 
prior year attendance.   In general, the program was not open to students already in private schools, but in FY99, the 
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Finally, a distinction exists between the assumption that 90% would have attended public schools and that 
90% would have attended MPS.  It may well be the case that a significant portion would have attended 
other public schools in Wisconsin, either by relocation or through Wisconsin’s inter-district transfer 
program, or through charter school enrollments.  As will be shown below, however, this would have only a 
minor effect on the analysis of the fiscal impact of the MPCP.
Potential Taxpayer Gains from the MPCP
The difference between the state and local revenues allocated to a student in public school and the MPCP 
voucher represents the potential taxpayer gains from each student who chooses to switch from public 
schools to the MPCP.  If all voucher students would otherwise have attended public schools, then the 
total potential gains to the taxpayers simply equals the number of voucher students multiplied by the per 
pupil difference between the revenue limit and the voucher.  However, for any voucher student who would 
have attended a private school anyway, the cost of the voucher is a net drain on public funds, offsetting 
the gains from those who switch.   The net gain (or loss) depends on the percent of such voucher students, 
discussed in the previous section.
Specifically, the basic equation is:
Net Impact = 
  (public revenue/pupil × reduction in public enrollment) 
- (voucher × MPCP enrollment)
year the Wisconsin court ruled that the MPCP could expand to include religious schools, private students in grades 
K-3 were allowed to enter.  In that year the DPI estimated there were about 4500 first-time MPCP enrollees, of whom 
2300 had been K-3 private students, 1400 came from MPS and 800 had either just started school or were of unknown 
prior status (March 22, 1999 Memorandum from Charlie Toulmin, Administrator of MPCP, to John R. Kalwitz, President 
City of Milwaukee Common Council, on Financial Impact of MPCP).  There are a number of difficulties in trying to infer 
from these data an estimate of the steady state number of non-switching voucher students, but the main problem is 
that the 2,300 K-3 non-switchers were almost all enrolled in these schools under privately-funded scholarships created 
in anticipation of a favorable court ruling on the program expansion (Peterson (2006), p. 79;  Sammis B. White, Peter 
Maier, John Stott and Christine Cramer, “PAVE’s Annual Report on Research:  Fifth Year,” Center for Urban Initiatives at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1998, p. 5;   Communication from Dan McKinley, President and CEO PAVE, January 5, 
2008.)  For a different view of the FY99 expansion and also the FY07 expansion, see Public Policy Forum, “Research Brief,” 
Volume 95, No. 1, February 2007.
 Another figure that was considered is found in the SCDP Baseline Report for the MPCP Longitudinal Educational 
Growth Study (LEGS), issued simultaneously with this report.  The LEGS report includes a Parental Survey that gauges 
satisfaction with the MPCP and MPS.   One question found that “51 percent of MPCP parents said that they would enroll 
their child in a private school next year and pay tuition if a school voucher was no longer available.”   This might or might 
not be an accurate prediction of the one-year behavior upon elimination of the MPCP, given that students are already in 
these schools, but it does not address the likely long-term impact of eliminating the MPCP or the likely path that would 
have obtained had the MPCP never existed – the question addressed by this study.
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The figures for the voucher and the MPCP enrollment are known, but, as we have seen, there have been 
different figures used for the per pupil effect of the MPCP on public revenues, and of course the reduction 
in public enrollment is subject to estimate.  Table 1 presents the estimated net impact for FY07 under 
varying assumptions.  The two columns correspond to the per pupil impact on MPS revenues, as implied 
by the LFB estimate ($9,682) and using the FY07 MPS revenue limit ($8,833), respectively.   The rows 
correspond to different assumptions regarding the percent of MPCP students that would have attended 
MPS, had the MPCP never existed.   
Table 1.  Net Impact of MPCP on Public Funds, FY07 ($ millions)
17,000 MPCP enrollees.   Voucher = $6,501
Per Pupil Impact on MPS Revenues
$9,682 (LFB) $8,833 (DPI)
% of MPCP students 
that would have 
attended MPS
100% $54.1 M $39.6 M
90% $37.6 M $24.6 M
80% $21.2 M $9.6 M
70% $4.7 M - $5.4 M
Positive Numbers Indicate Net Savings of Public Funds
The estimated net impact is somewhat sensitive to assumptions, ranging from a high of $54.1 
million to negative $5.4 million. 23  For most likely scenarios the net impact is positive, i.e. taxpayer 
savings.  The figure of $24.6 million is based on the FY07 MPS revenue limit and the assumption that 
90% of MPCP enrollees would have otherwise attended MPS (as discussed in the previous section).  
The 90% assumption can be more broadly construed as the percent of MPCP enrollees who would have 
attended public schools, either MPS or some other school as discussed above, without any major effect 
on the estimate of net impact.   For example, if we assume that 70% would have attended MPS and 20% 
would have attended other public schools, and if we take the state’s average revenue limit ($9,149 in 
FY07) for the other public schools, then the net impact would be $25.7 million instead of $24.6 million, a 
minor difference.  
Figure 6 presents the estimated net impact over the life of the program, using the MPS revenue limit and 
the 90% assumption.   Prior to the program’s expansion in FY99, the net gains were under $2.4 million, 
but as the program’s enrollment grew the net impact grew to an estimated $24.6 million in FY07 and 
$31.9 million in FY08.
23 The break-even point in the right-hand column is where 73.6% of voucher-users are non-switchers, the ratio of the 
voucher to per pupil revenues, $6,501/$8,833.
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Figure 6:  Potential Taxpayer Gains from the MPCP
(assumption:  90% of voucher students would otherwise have enrolled in MPS)
We now turn, in the remainder of this report, to the question of how these potential gains are allocated 
among various groups of taxpayers.   This requires a close examination of Wisconsin’s funding formulas, 
both for school districts and for the MPCP.
The General (non-MPCP) Wisconsin School Funding Formulas24
Wisconsin has two interlocked formulas that drive regular school funding – the revenue limit and 
equalization aid formulas.   The first key feature of this system is that a district’s available revenues rise 
and fall with enrollment – the system is enrollment-sensitive in the long run.   The second key feature is 
that the state provides a portion of each district’s “shared costs” according to property values, while the 
rest is provided by the local levy.  The third key feature is that the aid formula automatically adjusts to 
exhaust the state appropriation, with corresponding adjustments to local property taxes across the state.  
This means that any funds freed up by enrollment shifts from high-spending to low-spending districts 
automatically generate property tax relief shared across the state.
24  See “State Financing of K-12 Education in Wisconsin: Overview” September 26, 2007, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, www.
legis.state.wi.us/fb. 
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To get a bit more analytical, Wisconsin’s school funding formulas are driven by three key variables for each 
of the state’s 425 school districts – per pupil revenues, enrollment, and per pupil property values – together 
with the total school aid appropriation of the state legislature.   The basic structure is as follows:
Each district’s (1) per pupil revenues, from state and local sources together, is set at the previous year’s 
level, plus a state-specified increment.
Multiplying the specified per pupil revenue by district enrollment yields the (2) total revenue (state 
plus local) permitted for each district.
Summing across districts, the statewide revenue limit is split between (3) statewide school aid, 
determined by the legislature, and local property taxes.
Within the overall split, the (4) split for each district is determined by a formula based on per pupil 
spending and per pupil property values.
The long run response of a shift in enrollment from one district to another, holding everything else 
constant, is that state aid is reallocated by the full amount of per pupil spending.25  That is, although 
districts vary widely in their average state aid per student (since property wealth varies), their marginal 
state aid per student is essentially 100% of per pupil revenues.  To a first approximation, therefore, nothing 
else changes upon a shift in enrollment:  there is no effect on per pupil spending in either the sending 
or receiving district, nor is there any effect on property taxation in either district.  If enrollment shifts 
between districts with different per pupil expenditures, the impact on total spending is automatically 
absorbed by a change in property taxes, spread across the state.
In the more detailed discussion that follows (and in Appendix B), there will be modifications to the 
simplified version presented above.  However, this basic structure will provide the framework from which 
to evaluate the fiscal impact of the MPCP in the sections to follow.  We now turn to a more formal 
analysis of the two main formulas that drive the funding system:  Revenue Limits and Equalization Aid. 
25  This response is phased in over a three-year period, because the enrollment measure that drives the revenue limit 
formula is a three-year rolling average (see further discussion in Appendix B).  The term “long run” here, and throughout 
the text, is meant to remind the reader that the impact is not immediate.
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Revenue Limit26
Since 1993, Wisconsin’s Revenue Limit statute has set a maximum figure for each school district’s 
revenues from state and local sources.27  Basically, the statute takes each district’s previous per pupil 
revenues, increases it by an annual increment set in statute, and then multiplies that by enrollment to 
determine the revenue limit.
For policy analysis below, it will be helpful to introduce a few simple equations.  Formally, if we define piT 
as the per pupil revenue limit in district i and year T and EiT as enrollment, the total revenue limit RiT is 
determined by two equations:
Here, each district’s per pupil revenue increases over time from its base year level pi0 (the FY93 revenues 
per pupil), by an annual statewide increment Δpt which is set in statute with annual inflation adjustments 
(Δpt = $257 in FY07).28   For Milwaukee, the revenue limit was $8,833 per pupil in FY07; for the state’s 
median district p was $9,085.29  For each district, the result is multiplied by enrollment to give the annual 
revenue limit.
The key point here is that equation (1) is independent of shifts in enrollment:  a district’s per pupil 
revenue depends only on its base-year level, and a series of statewide increments.30  Consequently, the 
26  See “Local Government Expenditure and Revenue Limits,” January 2007, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau 
Informational Paper 12. www.legis.state.wi.us/fb/Informationalpapers/12.pdf. 
27  Some revenues are excluded from this limit, notably the various forms of categorical state aid, as well as local non-tax 
revenues.
28  The determination of the annual increments has changed since 1993.  Under current statute, dating to 1997, the annual 
increments increase by inflation each year.   This is not the same as increasing the per pupil revenue limit itself by 
inflation.   For example, if inflation is zero, the per pupil revenue limit will still increase by the previous year’s increment.   
From FY98 to FY07, this method yielded a cumulative increase in per pupil revenue that exceeded the cumulative rate 
of inflation (2.5% compounded) for the vast majority of districts (all those with per pupil revenue below $8,420 in FY98). 
29  To reiterate, the revenue limit does not include such categorical aids as special education reimbursements and “SAGE” 
grants (Student Achievement Guarantee in Education, for schools with high proportions of low-income pupils).   
Milwaukee would tend to receive an above-average portion of these funds, as well as of Federal funds, which are also 
not covered by revenue limits.
30  Unmodified, this system would freeze differentials in per pupil revenues among districts.  However, there is also a 
statewide minimum that is regularly raised to compress differentials ($8,400 in FY07; $8,700 in FY08; $9,000 in FY09).  
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effect of any policy change on the district’s revenue limit works solely through enrollment, holding p 
constant.  If we consider a policy that shifts 10,000 students from one district to another over the period 
from year 0 to year T, then the revenue limit in the sending district is reduced by 10,000 times that 
district’s piT, while the revenue limit in the receiving district is raised by 10,000 times its pjT .
Equalization Aid and Local Levy31
We now examine how Wisconsin’s formulas split the funding of total revenue between state aid and 
the local levy.   Equalization aid is the state’s main form of school aid.  It constitutes 98% of “General 
School Aid” for the state as a whole and 93% for Milwaukee.32   The total amount of equalization aid is 
determined by legislative appropriation,33 and the distribution of that total is governed by a formula based 
primarily on district property values per pupil.  Specifically, the distribution formula contains a parameter 
that is calibrated each year to generate total equalization aid that exhausts the state appropriation.  In this 
way, the legislature’s appropriation decision effectively decides the aggregate split between state and local 
school revenues, while property values apportion that split across districts.
The formula aims to equalize tax rates among districts with equal per pupil spending.  It does so through 
the concept of a state-guaranteed property tax base per pupil, such that differences in the property tax 
base are offset by the aid formula.34  The aid formula can be daunting in appearance, and can easily be 
misinterpreted, but with a bit of patience it can be correctly understood with regard to its central feature 
for present purposes:  the extent to which aid flows from one district to another as enrollment shifts.
This modification does not affect piT’s independence of enrollment.   Another feature that induces a bit of district 
variation in Δpt is discussed in Appendix B.
31  See “State Aid to School Districts,” January 2007, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau Informational Paper 27,  
www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/Informationalpapers/27.pdf.
32  General School Aid is the concept that enters the Revenue Limit, for determination of local levies.   For more detail, see 
Appendix B.  
33  From FY97 to FY03, state law specified that two-thirds of statewide school revenues should be provided by the 
state (including categorical aid, and also a school levy credit).  Since FY03 the state share has been at the legislature’s 
discretion, although the state’s implicit policy is to hew closely to the two-thirds rule.
34  Andrew Reschovsky has pointed out that the vast majority of equalization aid per pupil is distributed in a particularly 
simple fashion, as the difference between a fixed spending figure (p2 discussed below) and a fixed tax rate on each 
district’s per pupil property values.  Only a small portion of spending – the portion exceeding p2 – is truly governed by 
the guaranteed tax base formula.   See Andrew Reschovsky, “Reforming Wisconsin’s School Funding Formula”, November 
28, 2007, State Capitol, Madison. 
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The usual presentation calculates equalization aid, A, in three components, each of which is a share of the 
corresponding “tier” of “shared costs.”  “Shared costs” is similar to the concept used in revenue limits,35 and 
we shall use the same notation, p∙E.   (Here and below, we suppress subscripts i and t, for district and time, 
except where needed.)
Shared costs are broken down into three tiers p1∙E, (p2-p1)∙E, and (p-p2)∙E.  By statute, p1 is set at $1,000 
and p2 is set at 90% of the prior year’s statewide average for shared cost per pupil (p2 = $8,251 in FY07).   
The local levy’s share of each tier of spending is v/vh, where v is the district’s property values per pupil 
(prior year), while v1, v2, and v3, are cutoff points for guaranteed property values per pupil.   This means the 
state shares of these tiers are (1-v/vh), h=1,2,3.36  Putting this all together, the equation for state aid is:
The parameter v1 is set by statute at $1,930,000 (since FY03) and v3 is set at the prior year’s statewide 
average of property values per pupil ($483,015 for use in FY07).   The remaining parameter, v2, is not set 
in statute, but varies with the legislative decision on total appropriation – the value of this parameter is set 
to exhaust the appropriation on the aid determined by the formula ($1,292,558 in FY07). 
When the formula is built up in this fashion, it can lead one to conclude that aid is proportional to 
enrollment, so that when enrollment shifts, aid shifts by the aid per pupil.   However, this is incorrect.  The 
reason is that v, property values per pupil, also changes with enrollment.  To see this, write v = V/E, where 
V is total property values, and then simplify (3):
The expression now shows that to a first approximation (holding v2 constant for the moment) a district’s 
equalization aid varies with enrollment by the full per pupil spending, p, rather than just the per pupil aid.  
That is, under the Wisconsin formula, ΔA/ΔE = p > A/E:  the marginal aid exceeds the average aid per 
pupil.
35  See Appendix B for discussion of differences.
36  The state shares can be negative at one or more tiers.   However, there is a state hold harmless guaranteeing that each 
district will at least receive the primary tier aid.   There is also a hold harmless that primary tier aid is non-negative.   
These hold harmless provisions have not affected Milwaukee.
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Now turn to the local levy, which is that portion of shared cost not provided by the state.   It is given in 
the second term above:37 
Finally, note that v2 is determined by the requirement that district aid allotments, Ai, exhaust the state 
appropriation, S:
The equations above are intended to capture the essence of the funding formulas that are central to 
policy analysis. 38  Omitted details are certainly important to district fiscal authorities managing their 
yearly budgets, but their inclusion above would impede understanding of the logic of the policy impacts.  
Appendix B discusses a number of these details and why their omission does not have a material effect on 
our analysis. 
The Fiscal Impact of Enrollment Shifts
Consider a shift of enrollment, ΔE, from district j to district k.  Suppose further that pj > pk:  enrollment 
shifts from a higher-spending to lower-spending district.   Then revenue limits go down in district j 
and up, but by a smaller amount, in district k.  The direct effect of this shift is to move aid from district 
j to k by the full amount of the change in the revenue limits.  This leaves some aid left over, (pj - pk)∙ΔE, 
to spread across all districts.   The aid formula accomplishes this by raising v2, changing the overall 
split between levies and aid.  Specifically, it can be shown that each district’s levy drops by a portion of 
37  A portion of the levy is defrayed by the state, under the School Levy Tax Credit.   The amount of the credit is 
determined legislatively and apportioned among the municipalities, prior to sending out property tax bills.  In 2006, an 
appropriation of $593 M reduced school property taxes by an average of 15.2%.
38  There are a few other features of (4)-(5) that bear observation.  Equation (5) shows the specified tax rate, L/V, equals the 
parenthesized term.  Every element of that term is the same across districts, except p, so the tax rate is equalized across 
all districts with equal per pupil revenues.  Districts with higher p will have higher specified tax rates. (A complication 
is introduced by the hold harmless provisions, omitted from (4)-(5).  These provisions reduce the specified tax rate for 
districts with particularly high property values.)  On the aid side, equation (4) can be used to show that for districts with 
the same property values per pupil, the one with higher p will have higher aid per pupil, if the property value per pupil 
is below the state average (v < v3), and lower aid per pupil if property values exceed the state average (v > v3).
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the aid that is freed up, (pj - pk)∙ΔE, and its share of that is equal to its share of total property values.39  
Consequently, each district’s aid is adjusted upward by that amount, on top of the original change in aid 
from the change in the revenue limit. 
For example, suppose 17,000 students shifted out of Milwaukee, with pM=$8,833 (the figure for FY07) 
to some other district with px=$6,501.  The results are summarized in Table 2.  Milwaukee’s revenue limit 
would decline by $8,833 × 17,000 = $150.2 M and the other district’s revenue limit would rise by $6,501 
× 17,000 = $110.5 M.  As a first pass, aid would change by the same amounts.   However, this would free 
up $39.6 M of aid.  If the appropriation is unchanged, that $39.6 M is spread across districts in the form 
of reduced levies and correspondingly higher aid.   
Table 2:  Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student shift from Milwaukee to District X 
assumptions:  pM=$8,833,  px=$6,501
State Aid Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee - $147.7 M - $2.4 M - $150.2 M
District X + $110.5 M $0 + $110.5 M
All Other Districts + $37.2 M - $37.2 M $0
TOTAL $0 - $39.6 M - $39.6 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                                 -$2,332 x 17,000 = - $39.6 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                              $0
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                                       $0
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                                    + $2.4 M
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:                                                           + $37.2 M
Milwaukee’s share of the $39.6 M would be 6.1% of the total, $2.4 M, since its property values comprise 
6.1% of the state’s total.  Consequently, Milwaukee’s levies would drop by $2.4 M and its drop in aid 
would thus be mitigated to $147.7 M = $150.2 M - $2.4 M.   Suppose the district receiving these 17,000 
students has a negligible share of the state’s property values, so its levies would remain unchanged and its 
aid would rise by the full $110.5 M rise in the revenue limit.   For all other districts taken together, local 
levies would drop by $37.2 M = $39.6 M - $2.4 M, and aid would rise by the same amount.
39   
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To summarize:  there is no impact on per pupil revenues for students who remain in their districts, and 
spending is reduced on those students who shift districts.   The result is a saving to taxpayers.  Since the 
state appropriation is unchanged, there is no impact on state taxpayers:  the savings are all passed on to 
local taxpayers, spread across the state.   These impacts, summarized in the bottom of Table 2, must sum 
to zero.   
Fiscal Impact of a Voucher System Under General  
(non-MPCP) Funding Formulas
Suppose now that District X, above, is not a public school district, but is, instead, the set of private 
schools that accept vouchers, of $6,501 (the FY07 MPCP voucher).   This virtual district has no residents, 
property values, or levy.  Instead of aid, it receives vouchers, funded by the state.   If all 17,000 voucher 
students would have otherwise attended MPS, then the fiscal impacts would be the same as above.   The 
net benefit of $39.6 M (depicted earlier in Table 1) is spread among property taxpayers in Milwaukee and 
across the state.  
Now consider our assumption that only 90% of the 17,000 voucher students would have attended MPS, 
and 10% would have attended private schools anyway.  As we saw in Table 1, the net benefits to taxpayers 
are reduced to $24.6 M for FY07.   Table 3 provides detail.40  The smaller net benefit is represented by 
the smaller effect on Milwaukee’s revenue limit ($135.1 million vs. $150.2 million in Table 2).   The 
allocation of the net benefit is in the local levy column, as before, with corresponding effects on the state 
aid column.    The bottom half of Table 3 introduces a new party to the fiscal impact analysis – parents of 
voucher students who would have attended private school anyway.   These parents receive about a third of 
the savings from the reduced expenditures on students who leave MPS, and the other two-thirds goes to 
taxpayers.  Figure 7 extends these results back to FY94 and forward to FY08, to show how the potential 
gains depicted in Figure 6 could have been allocated under the general funding formulas.41
40  The equations underlying Table 3 and Figure 7 below are provided in Appendix C, along with equations for other tables 
and figures below.
41  This assumes Milwaukee’s share of property values is unchanged. 
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Table 3:  Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student voucher program under General Formula 
assumptions: as in Table 2, but only 90% voucher students from MPS.
State Aid/Vouchers Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee - $ 133.6 M - $1.5 M - $135.1 M
Voucher Schools + $110.5 M $0 + $110.5 M
All Other Districts + $23.1 M - $23.1 M $0
TOTAL $0 - $24.6 M - $24.6 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                      -$2,332 x 17,000 x 0.90 = - $35.7 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                              $0
Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:                             + $11.1 M
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                                       $0
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                                     + $1.5 M
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Figure 7:  Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under General Aid and Revenue Formulas
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS;  total of aid + voucher expenditures held constant)
Milwaukee property taxpayers Other property taxpayers
In Table 3 and Figure 7, it was assumed that the total state appropriation for aid and vouchers together 
is unchanged from the aid-alone appropriation.  That is, the state aid appropriation is reduced by the 
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full amount of the vouchers ($110.5 M in FY07).   It is difficult to assess the validity of this assumption 
or any alternative assumption, since it depends on a counterfactual, “what would the appropriation have 
been, absent the voucher program?”  This is a political economy question, rather than one of strict fiscal 
analysis.  One might argue that, in principle, it should not matter to legislators whether the appropriation 
for children in Milwaukee is directed to MPS or to voucher schools attended by students who would 
otherwise attend MPS.   If so, the total appropriation would be constant and the analyses above would be 
correct.
Alternatively, suppose voucher expenditures “don’t count” politically, so the total aid appropriation does 
not drop dollar-for-dollar when students leave for voucher schools.  More specifically, suppose the aid 
appropriation is determined by the 2/3 rule that was in statute for FY97-03, and has roughly guided 
policy since then.  That is, aid drops by 2/3 of the reduction in the Milwaukee revenue limit and property 
taxes statewide drop by the other 1/3.42  If the cut in aid is less than the state’s voucher expenditures, then 
there is an increase in the state tax burden (or a drain on other state expenditures).  Table 4 depicts the 
impact for FY07.  The net difference from Table 3 is greater property tax relief across the state, funded by 
state taxpayers.  Figure 8 shows how the potential gains would have been allocated over time under this 
alternative assumption regarding state appropriations. 
Table 4:  Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student voucher program under General Formula 
assumptions:  as in Table 3, but state aid drops by 2/3 drop in revenue limit
State Aid/Vouchers Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee - $132.4 M - $2.7 M - $135.1 M
Voucher Schools + $110.5 M $0 + $110.5 M
All Other Districts + $42.3 M - $42.3 M $0
TOTAL + $20.4 M - $45.0 M - $24.6 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                    -$2,332 x 17,000 x 0.90  = - $35.7 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                            $0
Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:                          + $11.1 M
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                         - $20.4 M
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                                +  $2.7 M
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:                                                        + $42.3 M
42 The 2/3 rule includes other funds besides general school aid and school property taxes, specifically categorical aid, 
expenditures on residential schools and also the school levy credit.  As a result, general school aid is less than 2/3 of the 
sum of general school aid and school property taxes.   However, it is still the case that the change in general school aid is 
2/3 of the change in the sum of general school aid and school property tax (i.e. 2/3 of the change in the revenue limit). 
27February 2008











FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
Figure 8:  Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under General Aid and Revenue Formulas
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS; state share of public education held constant at 2/3)
Milwaukee property taxpayers Other property taxpayers State taxpayers
To summarize:  
(1) The voucher program frees up funds, since students are willing to accept a voucher of smaller size than 
the per pupil revenues in MPS.   Some of that is offset by the provision of vouchers to students who would 
have attended private school anyway, but most plausible estimates indicate this is only a partial offset.
(2) The question addressed by the funding system is the disposition of freed-up funds.
(3) The regular Wisconsin funding formula is one where enrollment changes lead to corresponding shifts 
in aid, and where the local levies adjust to ensure that aid exhausts the state appropriation.   Had this 
formula been used to fund the voucher program, the result would have been a reduction in local property 
taxes, across the state.
(4) To the extent that the state would have chosen to increase the total appropriation (i.e. reducing aid by 
less than the voucher amount), there would have been an adverse impact on state taxpayers, matched by 
further reduction in local property taxes.  The 2/3 rule would have typically had this effect, during most of 
the MPCP history.
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Fiscal Impact of the Voucher System Under the  
MPCP Funding Formulas43
The previous section analyzed the hypothetical fiscal impact of the MPCP vouchers, had they been 
implemented under the state’s general formulas for revenue limits and equalization aid.   This provides 
a benchmark with which to compare the actual formulas used by Wisconsin to fund the MPCP.   These 
formulas have gone through a few distinct periods, with different mechanisms for allocating the potential 
gains among the various parties.   Throughout the history of the program, however, one constant has been 
the very uneven fiscal impact.   As the program has grown, it has become more important to understand 
the nature of the funding formulas, how they have evolved in attempts to deal with uneven impacts, and 
why those attempts have not fully succeeded.
Figure 9 summarizes the allocation of the MPCP’s net fiscal impact over the life of the program.   Since 
its inception, the MPCP has been funded in a fashion that has adversely impacted Milwaukee taxpayers, 
but since FY00, it has benefited non-Milwaukee property taxpayers and state taxpayers.  Figure 9 is 
based on the 90% assumption discussed above, but the same general pattern holds for widely varying 
assumptions on the percent of voucher students who would have attended MPS. 44  
 The analysis below explains how the funding mechanisms worked over each period and why they resulted 
in the patterns depicted in Figure 9.  The goal here is to understand why these patterns contrast so 
markedly with the alternatives offered by the regular funding formula, depicted in Figures 7 and 8.
43  See Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Information Paper 29, “Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” January 2007.
44 For example, the general pattern still holds even for the assumption of 70%, which, as Table 1 shows, implies a negative 
net benefit.   That is, under this assumption, there is still a sizeable net benefit for non-Milwaukee property taxpayers 
and state taxpayers, but not as large as the adverse impact on Milwaukee.  The various LFB reports also find the same 
general pattern of benefits to non-Milwaukee property taxpayers and adverse effect on Milwaukee for a wide range of 
the assumed percentage.
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Figure 9:  Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under the MPCP Formula
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS;  state share of public education held constant at 2/3)
Milwaukee property taxpayers Other property taxpayers State taxpayers Milwaukee Public Schools
MPCP Funding Formula Prior to FY00
The key feature of the funding formula prior to FY00 was that voucher enrollees were counted as part 
of MPS’ enrollment, for purposes of calculating both revenue limits and equalization aid.  The voucher 
amount was set equal to MPS’ average equalization aid per pupil and that amount was deducted from 
MPS’ aid, to fund the vouchers.   Finally, Milwaukee was allowed to replace the aid deduction by increases 
to its local levy, “and to a great extent did so.”45
This was a simple system, but it had a striking implication.   Even though the voucher was set below the 
MPS per pupil revenue limit, which would have reduced total public funding of education under the 
regular formula, that did not occur.  Since Milwaukee was authorized to raise the local levy to offset the 
aid deduction, the revenues available for MPS did not fall, despite the transfer of students and funds to 
voucher schools.  Thus, instead of reducing total public funding of education, this system increased it.  The 
fiscal impact was negative on taxpayers and positive on students remaining in MPS, by raising per pupil 
spending.46
45  “MPCP Facts and Figures for 1998-1999,” Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction.
46  It might be argued that at the outset of MPCP the number of voucher students was small enough that MPS fixed costs 
remained fixed, so per pupil costs rose.  By FY99, however, the number of voucher students was 5,761, a number that 
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Specifically, an enrollment shift from MPS to the voucher schools had no effect on the revenue limit, 
since it included the voucher students during this period.   Indeed, to the extent that some voucher 
students would not have attended MPS anyway, the MPCP actually increased MPS’ revenue limit, since 
it included all voucher students.   Thus, Milwaukee not only received funding for students who were no 
longer in their schools; it also received funding for at least a few students who would never have been in 
MPS.
Table 5 presents the fiscal impact of the MPCP using FY99 data, assuming 90% of that year’s 5,761 
voucher students would have otherwise attended MPS.  The other 576 students were new to Milwaukee’s 
enrollment figures, raising the revenue limit, and the state’s total by $6,852 per pupil (MPS’ per pupil 
revenue limit), or $3.9 M.  The main impact on local property taxes is the rise in Milwaukee’s levy to fund 
the vouchers, $28.2 million.   There was a slight additional effect, since one-third of the statewide rise in 
revenue limits would have been funded by higher property taxes across the state.47  The other two-thirds 
($2.6 million) would have come out of state funds, under the 2/3 rule.  
Table 5:  Fiscal Impact of 5,761 student voucher program under FY99 Formula 
assumptions: pM=$6,852,  px=$4,894.  90% voucher students from MPS.   
State Aid/Vouchers Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee - $24.3 M + $28.3 M + $3.9 M
Voucher Schools + $28.2 M $0 + $28.2 M
All Other Districts - $1.2 M + $1.2 M $0
TOTAL + $2.6 M + $29.5 M + $32.1 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                      -$1,958 x 5,761 x 0.90 =  - $10.1 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                 + $39.5 M
Fiscal Impact on Parents of non-Switching Voucher Students:                            + $2.8 M
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                          - $2.6 M
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                                - $28.3 M
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:                                                          - $1.2 M
would seem to be large enough that many fixed costs become variable.  Certainly the school level fixed costs for MPS 
would not pertain since MPCP attained the size of a large district.  Approximately 95 percent of all school districts in 
Wisconsin have fewer students than MPCP did in FY99; only five districts, including Milwaukee, have more students than 
MPCP has today.
47  During this period statute required the State Superintendent to ensure that no district’s aid (outside of Milwaukee) 
was reduced as a result of the program.  However, that would have required the state to estimate a counterfactual, the 
number of private stayers.  Presumably, the state met its legal requirement by interpreting the impact in such a way as 
to exclude these effects.
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The bottom half of Table 5 summarizes the fiscal impacts.  The net potential fiscal benefit was $7.3 million 
(as depicted previously in Figure 6).  This represents the $10.1 million in public funds potentially freed 
up by educating children with lower-cost vouchers, offset by the $2.8 million paid to parents of voucher 
students who it is assumed would have attended private schools anyway.   However, these potential savings 
were more than outweighed by the extra $39.5 M that was spent on the children who stayed in district.  
This represents the $6,852 per pupil revenue provided to MPS for each of the 5,761 voucher students 
who were not in MPS, thereby raising the per pupil expenditures on those who remained.  These extra 
expenditures (net of the potential savings) were funded primarily by higher Milwaukee property taxes, 
with a smaller amount coming from other property taxes and state funds.   
To summarize, the funding system prior to FY00 provided a completely different disposition of the funds 
freed up by lower-cost vouchers than would have been provided by the regular funding system analyzed 
earlier.   Specifically:
(1)  Instead of applying potential savings to reduced property taxes across the state, the system raised 
property taxes in Milwaukee, and spent it, together with the savings from lower vouchers, on higher 
per pupil spending for the remaining MPS students.    These effects are seen in Figure 9 for the period 
FY94-99.  The positive impact on MPS per pupil spending is depicted by the green bars, and the adverse 
impact on Milwaukee property taxes is depicted by the blue bars in the negative portion of the graph.
(2)  In addition, to the extent that vouchers went to students who would have been in private school 
anyway, this led to increased property taxes across the state and a greater demand on state tax revenues.   
However, the amounts were relatively small, as depicted in Figure 9 by the slivers of maroon and tan over 
the period FY94-99.
MPCP Funding FY00-FY01
In 1999, a major change was enacted:  voucher enrollees would no longer be counted as part of MPS 
enrollment.   This was a major step toward integrating the voucher program into Wisconsin’s underlying 
enrollment-sensitive funding formula.  It eliminated the extra spending on students remaining in MPS.  
However, vestiges of the previous formula remained, and other complications were added.
Specifically, the previous practice of deducting district aid to fund the vouchers persisted, but only half 
the cost of the vouchers was deducted from MPS aid and the other half from the rest of the state’s 
districts (proportionate to their aid).    As before, any district’s aid deduction for MPCP could be offset 
by an increase in the local levy, since the net aid is deducted from the revenue limit to determine the 
allowed levy.  
It is worth emphasizing here the overall significance of these changes before considering the other 
complications below.   Since voucher students were removed from MPS enrollment counts, the state no 
longer provided MPS with aid for them.  This was certainly a move toward rationalizing the funding 
mechanism.   However, the state continued to deduct voucher money from the remaining aid allocation.  
To be sure, the deduction was cut in half, but the rationale behind any deduction would seem to have 
disappeared with the removal of voucher students from the MPS aid determination in the first place.  
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Finally, MPS was allowed to replace the aid deduction by raising the property tax, so the net result was to 
perpetuate the adverse effect of the MPCP on Milwaukee taxpayers, albeit in attenuated form.
We also have to consider the two-thirds rule that was in effect.   The exclusion of voucher students from 
MPS enrollment counts reduced shared costs, so statewide property taxes would be reduced by one-third 
of this amount and statewide aid would be reduced by two-thirds of it.48  However, for the purpose of 
determining statewide shared costs, the local levy augmentation for MPCP was included.49  In effect, 
this added the voucher costs to statewide shared costs so that under the 2/3 rule this would help offset 
the reduction in the state’s total aid appropriation that would otherwise follow from excluding MPCP 
enrollment counts from MPS 
The net result is depicted in Table 6, for the FY01 values of the voucher amount, enrollment and per pupil 
revenues for MPS.   The key figure we continue to focus on is the reduction in public spending on voucher 
students.  In FY01, the saving on each of the voucher students who would have attended MPS (90% of 
9,238) is $2,049 = $7,375 - $5,326, for a total of $17.0 M.  This is partially offset by the $4.9 M that goes 
to parents of voucher students who would have attended private schools anyway.  Unlike the pre-FY00 
system, all of these savings go to taxpayers, rather than extra spending on MPS students.   This follows 
from the exclusion of voucher students from Milwaukee’s revenue limit.
Table 6:  Fiscal Impact of 9,238 student voucher program under FY01 Formula 
pM=$7,375,  voucher=$5,326.  Assuming 90% of students from MPS.  
State Aid/Vouchers Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee ($ 82.7 M) $21.4 M ($61.3 M)
Voucher Schools $49.2 M $0 $49.2 M
All Other Districts $25.4 M ($25.4 M) $0
TOTAL ($8.1 M) ($4.0 M) ($12.1 M)
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                   -$2,049 x 9,238 x 0.90 =  - $17.0 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                          $0
Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:                          + $4.9 M
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                       + $8.1 M
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                              - $21.4 M
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:                                                      + $25.4 M
The benefit to taxpayers is split between state and local according to the 2/3 rule.   However, the 1/3 
benefit for local taxpayers is allocated quite asymmetrically between Milwaukee and the rest of the state.  
48  The LFB analysis of September 27, 2001, cited earlier, does not include the effect of the enrollment shift from MPS.  As a 
result, that analysis finds a net increase in state and local taxes, rather than a decrease. 
49  This was a change from the pre-FY00 period.
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There are two effects here.   First, the local levies for Milwaukee and the rest of the state each rise by one-half 
the total voucher amount of $49.2 M.  However, to restore the 1/3 local share for total revenues, the statewide 
levies had to be reduced, and shifted to aid, by $53.2 M.   But these gains are apportioned by the district’s share 
of property values.   Since Milwaukee has far less than one-half the state’s property values, this mitigated very 
little of Milwaukee’s local taxpayer share of the voucher costs.   The rest of the state (taken together) enjoyed a 
net reduction in local taxes when all was said and done.
To summarize:
(1) The removal of voucher students from MPS revenue limits allowed the net savings from the voucher 
program to go to taxpayers instead of the remaining MPS students, as in the pre-FY00 system.   In Figure 9, the 
green bars disappear.  They are replaced by maroon and tan bars in the positive portion of the graph, representing 
net benefits for state taxpayers and especially property taxpayers outside of Milwaukee.  
(2) The shift of 50% of the MPCP aid reduction and levy offset away from MPS reduced the adverse effect 
on Milwaukee property taxpayers, but that adverse effect persisted, as the program grew.   The blue bars in the 
negative portion of Figure 9 shrunk in FY00, but then continued to grow thereafter.
MPCP Funding FY02-FY03
In 2001, the statute dropped the MPCP aid deduction and levy offset for districts other than Milwaukee.  It 
also reduced Milwaukee’s deduction from 50% to 45% of the voucher costs (which could still be tacked onto the 
levy).  The other 55% of the voucher costs now came directly from the General Fund.
The 2/3 rule was still in effect, but the MPCP levy hike was no longer counted toward statewide shared costs.50  
Thus, the fall in Milwaukee’s revenue limit, due to the enrollment shift, is the only effect of MPCP on the 2/3 
rule calculation.
The main effects of these changes are on property taxpayers outside of Milwaukee and state taxpayers.   The non-
Milwaukee taxpayers lose the previous benefit of almost all the aid increase under the 2/3 rule for the voucher 
expenses, and, in the aggregate, this outweighs the fact that they no longer pay half these expenses.51  Conversely, 
the state taxpayers gain from not having to increase state aid by 2/3 of the voucher expenses, and this outweighs 
the fact that they now have to pay 55% of them directly.   
To summarize, the net effects of these changes were fairly modest, resulting in a small shift of benefits from 
non-Milwaukee taxpayers to state taxpayers.  This can be seen in Figure 9, where the maroon bar for non-
Milwaukee property taxpayers shrinks in FY02, in favor of the tan bar for state taxpayers.  Table 7 gives more 
detail on the impact using FY03 figures.
50    For that reason, the new deduction of 45% was thought to be comparable to the old figure of 50%. 
51  Of course, the elimination of the direct payment for MPCP was a quite visible benefit for non-Milwaukee taxpayers, compared 
to the much less visible adverse impact of the change to the 2/3 rule. 
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Table 7:  Fiscal Impact of 11,231 student voucher program under FY03 Formula 
pM=$7,776,  voucher=$5,783.  Assuming 90% of students from MPS  
State Aid/Vouchers Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee ($ 106.2 M) $27.6 M ($78.6 M)
Voucher Schools $64.9 M $0 $64.9 M
All Other Districts $24.6 M ($24.6 M) $0
TOTAL ($16.7 M) $3.0 M ($13.7 M)
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                    -$1,993 x 11,231 x 0.90 =  - $20.1 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                             $0
Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:                            + $6.5 M
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                           $16.7 M
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                                 -$27.6 M
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:                                                           $24.6 M
MPCP Funding FY04-FY08
The 2/3 rule was dropped in 2003, restoring the legislature’s discretion to set the state appropriation.  
However, as noted above, the 2/3 rule-of-thumb seems to have persisted as a non-binding guide to 
policy.   The state still regularly publishes the statistic, using the measure previously established in law.  
For FY04-07, the calculated state share ranged from 63.7% to 66.3%.  For the purposes of this analysis 
of MPCP’s impact, we assume that in the absence of MPCP the state share would have been 2/3.52   As 
Figure 9 shows, under this assumption, the patterns in FY04-07 were simply a continuation of prior 
patterns, augmented by growth in the program.
Table 8 depicts the effects of MPCP in detail for FY07.  The reduction in MPS’ revenue limit is $135.1 
million, as calculated from the per pupil revenue limit of $8,833 for 90% of the 17,000 voucher students.  
The voucher expenses are $110.5 million ($6,501 for each of the 17,000 students).   This leaves a net 
taxpayer benefit of $24.6 million.  This benefit is generated by the savings of $35.7 million from those 
students who forgo the MPS per pupil revenues in favor of the lower cost voucher, partially offset by the 
$11.1 million spent on vouchers for those who would not have been in MPS.
52  An alternative assumption would have been to take the actual shares, but since these are so close to 2/3 (it was 66.1% 
in FY07), the results would have been indistinguishable.  
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The allocation of the $24.6 million net benefit among taxpayers is as follows.  Since the statewide revenue 
limit drops by $135.1 million, the state aid allocation drops by 2/3 of that, or $90.1 million.  This is 
partially offset by the state general fund’s 55% share of the voucher expenditures ($60.8 million), for a net 
benefit to the state taxpayers of $29.3 million.  The other 1/3 of the drop in statewide revenue limit, $45.0 
million, goes to property tax relief, of which the vast majority ($42.3 million) accrues to those outside of 
Milwaukee.  Milwaukee’s share of this benefit ($2.7 million) is swamped by the MPCP levy hike, which 
is 45% of the voucher expenditures, resulting in a net adverse impact on Milwaukee property taxpayers of 
$47.0 million.
It may be informative to compare this with Table 4, which also considered the impact of MPCP under 
the 2/3 rule, but otherwise run through the general formulas.   To recall, instead of funding 55% of the 
voucher from the general fund and 45% through Milwaukee, Table 4 considered the case where 100% was 
run through the general fund.  The difference between the two funding mechanisms is a pure shift of the 
burden for 45% of the vouchers from the Milwaukee taxpayers to state taxpayers.    One may also recall 
the mechanism in Table 3, under which, again, the voucher was run through the general fund, but state aid 
was reduced by the full amount of the voucher expenditures ($110.5 million in this case), instead of the 
smaller amount ($90.1 million) under the 2/3 rule.   As we saw, under that mechanism no set of taxpayers 
was adversely affected by MPCP.  
Table 8:  Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student voucher program under FY07 Formula pM=$8,833,  
voucher=$6,501.  Assuming 90% of students from MPS & 2/3 policy.
State Aid/Vouchers Local Levy TOTAL
Milwaukee ($ 182.1 M) $47.0 M ($135.1 M)
Voucher Schools $110.5 M $0 $110.5 M
All Other Districts $42.3 M ($42.3 M) $0
TOTAL ($29.3 M) $4.7 M ($24.6 M)
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:                   -$2,332 x 17,000 x 0.90 =  - $35.7 M
Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:                                                             $0
Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:                           + $11.1 M
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:                                                                        + $29.3 M
Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:                                                 -$47.0 M
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:                                                         +$42.3 M
The issue of the “funding flaw” — the adverse impact on Milwaukee taxpayers — had been simmering for 
years and made its way into the budget debate for FY08-09, with proposals by the Governor and the City 
of Milwaukee.   No formula reform was enacted in this cycle, however.  Instead the problem was partially 
addressed with something of an ad hoc fix, by which the state appropriated $9 M of “high poverty aid” in 
FY08 and $12 M in FY09 to reduce the school property tax burden, primarily of Milwaukee.  For FY08, 
Milwaukee received $7.4 million of this aid, with corresponding property tax relief.  This is seen in Figure 
9, with the shrinkage of Milwaukee’s blue bar, and the corresponding shrinkage of the tan bar representing 
state taxpayers’ benefit.
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Conclusions 
The potential fiscal benefit of MPCP for Wisconsin taxpayers may be substantial, as families voluntarily 
choose schools that draw on fewer public resources than are allocated per pupil to MPS.  The difference 
has risen from about $2,000, from FY97 to FY03, to over $2,600 in FY08.  Coupled with the dramatic 
growth in voucher enrollments, the potential savings may now exceed $30 million, as depicted in Figure 
6.  Categorical programs, excluded from this analysis, offer additional savings.  For example, the SAGE 
program offers conditional grants to Milwaukee (and other districts) of $2,000 per low income student 
(rising to $2,250 in FY08), which are not included in the per pupil revenue limits used in this paper, and 
which add to taxpayer savings when such students choose MPCP.
The allocation of these benefits among different classes of taxpayers has been a challenge for Wisconsin 
over the years.  In the early years, when the benefits were small, the allocation was not a major issue.  It 
seems that the course of least resistance was to fund the program out of MPS aid, and to ensure that MPS 
revenues did not decline in those early days, even as voucher students left, Milwaukee taxpayers picked up 
the tab.  When the program expanded in FY99, however, the strains of this simple arrangement became 
evident, as depicted in Figure 9.
A potentially appealing solution was available in the existing revenue and aid formulas, which are highly 
enrollment-sensitive and thus compatible with the logic of choice.  These formulas would allocate the 
gains among property taxpayers in Milwaukee and across the state, as depicted in Figure 7.  If additional 
property tax relief was desired, these formulas also offered a ready solution, under which voucher 
expenditures need not be offset dollar-for-dollar by aid cuts, as under the 2/3 rule, underlying Figure 8.
In FY00, Wisconsin made an important move toward integrating the MPCP with these enrollment-
driven formulas, by excluding voucher enrollment from the calculation of MPS revenue limits and 
general school aid.  However, Wisconsin was unable to make a full break from the system under which 
it began.  The MPCP funding mechanism continues to deduct aid from MPS for voucher expenses, even 
though the general aid formulas no longer allocate any funds to MPS for voucher students.   Since MPS 
is allowed to recoup these funds by raising the property tax, the net result is a continuing adverse impact 
on Milwaukee property taxpayers. Comparing Figure 9 with Figures 7 and 8, one sees how large the 
discrepancy has now become between the existing system and a system that might share the fiscal benefits 
of MPCP with Milwaukee.
The history of MPCP illustrates how voucher programs can provide significant taxpayer savings, when 
students voluntarily choose programs that draw less on public funds than the schools they would 
otherwise attend.  However, the same history also illustrates that if the funding formulas are not carefully 
constructed, some groups of taxpayers may be adversely affected instead of sharing in the net savings.  The 
initial funding mechanism may have been well-designed for the purpose at hand, when the program was 
small.  However, as the program grew, the mechanism carried unintended distributional consequences.   
Attempts to reform the mechanism have achieved some success, but the vestiges of the initial system 
continue to drive the allocation of burdens and benefits, even as the program has outgrown the funding 
system’s origins.
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Appendix A:  Review of selected previous literature
As an example of the first phase of the literature, Henry Levin compares the voucher and per pupil MPS 
expenditures for FY97.53  Specifically, he considers the claim of Paul Peterson and Chad Noyes “that 
Milwaukee voucher schools were receiving only half as much for each student as the Milwaukee Public 
Schools.”54  Levin compares the $4,373 voucher with two sorts of figures received from MPS:  the system’s 
per pupil budgeted expenditure, $7,628, and various site-based expenditures, ranging from $3,042 to 
$3,815, depending on grade level.  According to Levin, the main sources of the huge difference between 
these measures of MPS expenditures are special education and transportation, both funded at the central 
office.   Levin argues that it is more appropriate to compare the voucher with the site-based expenditures, 
but after considering other adjustments, and acknowledging that his calculations do “not constitute a 
precise cost-accounting”.  He concludes that “the costs of similar services at the school site may favor 
slightly the Milwaukee voucher schools.”
After the expansion of the program in FY99 to include religious schools, studies by researchers at the 
People for the American Way and the American Federation of Teachers undertook a more detailed 
comparison of spending in voucher schools and MPS, and also compared private school tuitions with their 
spending and the size of the voucher.55  The objective of this research was to determine if public funds that 
went to voucher schools constituted an “overpayment” that might allow the churches to divert funds that 
were previously spent on education to other activities, thereby arguably constituting “compelled taxpayer 
support of religion.”  The heart of the argument went roughly as follows:  (1) prior to MPCP, tuitions of 
religious schools were below operating costs, so that religious education was subsidized from other church 
53  Henry M. Levin (1998), “Educational Vouchers:  Effectiveness, Choice, and Costs,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 17 (3), 373-392.
54  Unpublished 1996 paper, “Under Extreme Duress, School Choice Success,” Harvard University Program in Education 
Policy and Governance, later published in Diane Ravitch and Joseph Viteritti, eds. New Schools for a New Century: The 
Redesign of Urban Education, Yale University Press, 1997.   A more recent paper by Peterson (2006), with Nathan Torinus 
and Brad Smith, compares the FY05 voucher of $5,943 with a figure of $9,024 for MPS per pupil expenditures, which is a 
ratio of 66%.
55  R. Egen, D. Holmes, and E. Mincberg (2000), “The 40 Percent Surcharge:  How Taxpayers Overpay for Milwaukee’s Private 
School Voucher Program,” Washington, D.C., People for the American Way.  F. Howard Nelson, Rachel Egen, Dwight 
Holmes (2001), “Revenues, Expenditures and Taxpayer Subsidies in Milwaukee’s Voucher Schools,” paper presented at 
the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Education Finance Association.
38 February 2008
The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008
revenues; (2) the voucher exceeded the published tuitions existing at many of the religious schools; (3) 
therefore vouchers would allow religious institutions to reduce the church subsidy to their schools, freeing 
up church funds for non-educational religious purposes.  However, since the MPCP voucher is also below 
many of these schools’ operating costs (by law it is prohibited from being more), then the expansion of 
enrollment in these schools would also require church subsidy.  In any case, this line of analysis appears 
to have been rendered moot by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Zelman that vouchers for religious 
schools did not violate the establishment clause.
More recent analyses of the fiscal impact of MPCP have had a different focus.  Instead of focusing on the 
impact on the finances of the religious schools, these analyses focused on the impact on the public schools 
and taxpayers.  Thus, instead of comparing the voucher with the pre-voucher tuition, one returns to the 
comparison of the voucher with MPS per pupil expenditures.
Among the more prominent such recent analyses is that of Susan Aud, a Senior Fellow at the Milton 
and Rose D. Friedman Foundation.56   This study examines the fiscal impact of all U.S. voucher programs, 
including MPCP.   For MPCP, the size of the voucher is understood to equal MPS’ per pupil state aid,57 
and Aud compares NCES estimates of that figure with instructional expenditures per student in MPS.   
The difference is found to fluctuate around $300, so that is the figure that Aud takes to be the per pupil 
savings from vouchers.  Her aggregate figure is $4.8 million for FY06 and the 16-year total is $28.3 
million.  Aud then analyzes the MPCP funding formulas to determine how these savings are spread 
among taxpayers.  Consistent with much public discussion (and the findings of this report), Aud finds that 
the fiscal impact has been adverse for Milwaukee taxpayers since 1999.  However, other important aspects 
of her analysis (the calculated impact on state taxpayers and the exclusion of non-Milwaukee property 
taxpayers) seem to be based on an incomplete understanding of Wisconsin’s funding formulas.58
56  “Education by the Numbers:  The Fiscal Effect of School Choice Programs, 1990-2006,” Milton & Rose D. Friedman 
Foundation, April 2007.
57  Aud states that “the voucher is limited to the amount of state equalization aid per student received by the Milwaukee 
public school district in the same year.”   This was originally true, but not since 1999.
58  A few examples:  (i) Aud seems to assume that as enrollment shifts, the average aid per pupil shifts with it.  This is 
incorrect. (ii) Aud makes no mention of the important FY00 change in the funding formula’s treatment of voucher 
enrollments, and her analysis does not reflect that change.  (iii) The funding formula has automatic adjustments to each 
district’s aid and local taxes to make the total aid appropriation match the formula’s distribution.  Aud’s analysis does not 
seem to reflect this feature.
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Bruce Baker, of the University of Kansas, critiqued Aud’s study for the Think Tank Review Project.59  He 
finds that Aud’s analysis “confirm[s] an obvious point,” that the gap between the voucher and per pupil 
spending does create potential savings.  In fact, his figure for estimated voucher savings in Milwaukee is 
$38.6 million in FY0560, which is $2,674 per voucher student -- about 9 times the figure given by Aud.  
Baker has two main criticisms of Aud’s conclusions.  First, potential savings are relatively small, compared 
to total current expenditures for the state:  his figure for Wisconsin is 0.46% in FY05.   This simply 
follows from the fact that although the voucher students comprise a sizeable portion of Milwaukee’s 
total enrollments (about 13% that year), they are a negligible portion of statewide enrollments.  Second, 
Baker argues that although the voucher program may provide the “opportunity” for MPS to reduce 
its expenditures, he believes this result is unlikely or at least uncertain.   However, Wisconsin’s revenue 
limits statute, combined with the MPCP statute (as it has existed since FY00), does in fact reduce MPS 
expenditures correspondingly.
59  Review of “School Choice by the Numbers:  The Fiscal Effects of School Choice Programs 1990-2006,” Education Policy 
Research Unit, Arizona State University, May 2007.
60  This figure, which is provided in Baker’s Table 5, assumes “no change to local share.”
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Appendix B:  Further Details in Funding Formulas 
This appendix considers various details of the funding formulas that are omitted from the text.  While a 
number of these features are important for short-term effects, they do not have a material impact on the 
long-term properties that are our concern.  
Revenue limit vs. actual revenues.(i)   Although districts are not required to raise local levies up to 
the amount allowed by the revenue limit, in practice that is what almost all districts do, including 
Milwaukee.61  That is why, in the text, we do not make a distinction between actual revenues and 
the revenue limit. 
The timing of the enrollment measure(ii) .   In the Revenue Limit formula, enrollment is a three-
year moving average of September FTE’s, including the current year.62  This has no effect on the 
evolution over time of the per pupil revenue limit, p, since the increments are specified legislatively 
(except as indicated in (iii) below).    
 
The enrollment measure for Equalization Aid is of the prior year only (average of September and 
January FTE’s).  This would, in general, be comparable to the Revenue Limit’s three-year average, 
since that would approximate the year on which it is centered (the prior year) during periods of 
steady (or negligible) enrollment growth or decline.   Thus, the E’s in (3) and (4) are not quite 
the same as in (2), but are close:  for FY02-FY07 they never differed by more than 0.5%, and the 
average difference was under 0.2%.  More importantly, in considering the fully-phased in effect of 
changes in enrollment (as is our focus), there is no material difference between these two measures. 
Recurring exemptions to the revenue limit.(iii)    There are some exemptions which get added to 
the revenue limit and remain in the base figures for the following year’s calculations.  These 
exemptions are usually small.  For Milwaukee, the only significant recurring exemption recently 
has been for revenues to cover “transfer of service,” which typically refers to costs of students with 
serious disabilities, over and above what is reimbursed from categorical aids.  It has the effect 
of raising Milwaukee’s Δpt above the state-specified increment.  Thus, in FY07, Milwaukee’s p 
61  Statewide, approximately 99.8% of revenue limit capacity is used.  In recent years, Milwaukee has used 100.0%.  Note 
also that if a district does set revenues below its limit, it can carry over the entire underlevy that is due to a recurring 
exemption (see (iii) below).
62  Summer school enrollment is also counted, as a 40% FTE, although this is typically negligible.   This is also true for 
Equalization Aid’s enrollment measure, discussed below.
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rose by $288 (from $8,545 to $8,833) vs. $257 for the state-specified increment. The extra $31 
represents the per pupil effect of FY06’s $3.0 M “transfer of service” exemption, carried forward 
on a per pupil basis.  Again, this has no material effect on the analysis of MPCP’s fiscal impact. 
Non-recurring exemptions to the revenue limit.(iv)   These are exemptions that get added to the 
revenue limit for the year in which they occur, but are not retained in the base figures for the 
following year’s calculation.  The key example here (the only one that has applied recently to 
Milwaukee) is for enrollment declines.  If a district’s enrollment measure (a three-year average) 
declines in any given year, there is a one-year adjustment to the revenue limit offsetting that 
decline.  Over the long haul, a permanent drop in enrollment will be fully reflected in the revenue 
limit, as indicated in equation (2), but the impact is effectively phased in over time, due to the 
combination of the three-year averaging and this non-recurring exemption. Thus, the one-year 
impact of this exemption can be significant, but not for the purpose of evaluating long-run policy 
impacts.63 
What state and local funds are covered by revenue limits.(v)   On the state side, the revenue limit 
covers “General School Aid,” which includes Equalization Aid (the main state formula aid) and 
two much smaller programs.   Statewide Equalization Aid totaled $4,620.4 M in FY07, and 
Milwaukee received $637.9 M.  The two smaller pieces of General School Aid are Integration Aid 
(payments for intradistrict and interdistrict pupil transfers to facilitate integration) and Special 
Adjustment Aid (a form of hold harmless payments).  Statewide, these programs totaled $89.0 M 
and $13.3 M respectively in FY07, of which Milwaukee received $49.1 M of the former and none 
of the latter.  As stated earlier, revenue limits do not cover categorical aid, which totaled $572 M 
statewide in FY07. 
 
On the local side, the revenue limit covers levies for general operations, as well as certain capital 
projects and debt service, 64 but not others (e.g. debt approved by voter referendum and levies for 
“community services”).  
 
63  In the last few years Milwaukee’s enrollment declines have accelerated, reaching 2,127 and 2,767 for the three-year 
averages used in FY07 and FY08 respectively.  Coupled with the rise in the per pupil revenue limit, this led to a rise in 
this exemption to $14.1 M in FY07.   Milwaukee was not alone:  in FY07, 245 of the state’s 424 districts received such an 
adjustment.  Beginning in FY08, the legislature raised the offset from 75% to 100%, and Milwaukee’s exemption rose to 
$25.3 M.
64  The revenue limit includes a piece of the local levy that is reimbursed by the state in order to exempt computers from 
the locally funded property tax base.
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In short, the revenue limit covers almost all the state and local revenues that would be affected by 
MPCP.  The main exception is categorical aids.
Shared cost vs. revenue limit.(vi)   The Equalization Aid formula uses the concept of “Shared Cost,” 
which is close but not identical to the Revenue Limit.   Some of the differences include the 
difference between expenditures and revenues, and the treatment of payments-in-lieu of taxes.  
On average, these differences result in less than 1% discrepancy between shared cost per pupil 
and revenue limit per pupil.  A larger difference is that shared costs are based on the previous 
year’s expenditures for the determination of the current year’s Equalization Aid, whereas the 
current year’s Revenue Limit includes an increment to the previous year’s per pupil figure.  Again, 
however, this should not distort the analysis of the long-run impact of changes in enrollment, such 
as those occasioned by MPCP.
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Appendix C:  Equations Underlying Tables and Figures
Table 3 and Figure 7
The revenue limit calculations of Table 3 are based on these equations:65 
This frees up pMΔEM - pxΔEx in aid, which is split among property taxpayers in all districts:66 
and each district’s aid is adjusted upward accordingly: 
In the bottom half of Table 3, the net benefits are decomposed as follows:
The first term on the right-hand side is the reduction in spending on those students who switch, and the 
second term is the spending on vouchers for students who would not have attended MPS.  
65  Note that the changes we are considering are relative to having no vouchers.   Thus ΔEx is actually Ex.  Also, the 
enrollment change for Milwaukee ΔEM, is defined in absolute value, rather than algebraic. 
66  There is a slight complication due to the reduction in Wisconsin’s total public enrollment, which will slightly raise the 
average valuation per pupil, v3.  Strictly speaking, the analyses in this paper hold v3 constant and only let v2 vary.  The 
impact of this simplification is a very slight distortion of the distribution of levies between Milwaukee and the other 
districts.
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Table 4 and Figure 8
Given ΔRM from (7), the 2/3 rule implies
and each district’s aid is adjusted upward accordingly:
Table 5 and FY94-99 in Figure 9
During this period, Milwaukee’s revenue limits include the voucher students, so 
RM = pM∙(EM + Ex ), and 
The expressions for changes in local levies and aid reflect the MPCP aid deduction and levy substitution, 
as well as the 2/3 rule:
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Table 6 and FY00-01 in Figure 9
Voucher students were removed from revenue limits, so we have (7) again, for ΔRM.
The expressions for changes in local levies and aid reflect the split of the MPCP aid deduction between 
Milwaukee and other districts (denoted as ~M).  The expressions also reflect the 2/3 rule, including the 
addition of aid for 2/3 of the MPCP levy hike:
Table 7-8 and FY02-07 in Figure 9
The revenue limit calculation is unchanged from (7II).   The expressions for changes in local levies and 
aid reflect the elimination of the MPCP deduction from non-Milwaukee districts and the adjustment of 
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